This paper develops a model of housing decisions which allows for social interactions within residential neighborhoods to impact homeowners' valuation of their own properties. The model is used to structure an empirical investigation with data from the American Housing Survey for 1985 and 1989. It explores in great detail a relatively neglected feature of the data, namely the availability of data of neighborhood clusters for standard metropolitan areas in the United States. This feature of the data allows us to model empirically the effects of social interactions at the immediate residential neighborhood level, with neighborhoods consisting of a dwelling unit and its ten nearest neighbors. Most previous work on neighborhoods has used contextual information associated with the census tract where a unit of observation belongs.
Introduction
Residential neighborhoods are where most people spend a large fraction of their lives and where many of their social and economic interactions take place. In the United States, an extraordinary set of formal and informal organizations of civil society evolves around residential neighborhoods.
Local control of public schools and substantial power of locality-based organizations in the formation of community jurisdictions is one of the key characteristics of the flexibility of U.S. economic and social institutions. 2 The institutional flexibility goes hand-in-hand with the extraordinary residential mobility of the U.S. population: 17% of the total resident population (with the percentage being the same for 30 to 44 year-olds) moved homes from 1991-1992, with moves being more frequent in the West (21%) and less in the Northeast (12%). This process, together with the forces of urban growth and decay, facilitate the spatial arbitrage which is crucial for the valuation of U.S. residential capital.
The latter, in 1991, at 7,889 billion dollars was nearly three times the 2,688 billion dollars of total assets of U.S. manufacturing corporations. 3 Housing is a major component both of the consumption bundle and of personal wealth and the single most important component of the tax base of primarily residential communities. A fair amount of research has addressed the way in which individuals accumulate wealth. However, past research has not considered in depth either the spatial aspects of the process nor its interaction with neighborhood change. These two are of course interdependent. The value of a particular house may go up because of capital gains due to proximity to other valuable property or other types of desirable developments in its vicinity. A full understanding of the microeconomic underpinnings of the determinants of the market value of housing ( and thus of residential capital ) will benefit from careful attention to the dynamics of interaction within residential neighborhoods. This paper presents an empirical investigation of residential neighborhood effects. It relies on data from the American Housing Survey (AHS), which are collected from a panel of dwelling units 2 Economists have shown interest in the phenomenon of the formation of jurisdictions, especially as reflected in the Tiebout model [Tiebout (1956) ]. Benabou (1996) and Durlauf (1997) have reconsidered the fundamental underpinnings of this model with special emphasis to inequality. Lack of empirical attention to key ideas underpinning Tiebout's theory would have been astonishing were it not for a recent revival of interest recently; see Hoyt and Rosenthal (1995) .
3 Source: Statistical Abstract of the United States (1994), T. 1213 and 866. See also, T. 745.
and their current occupants. It makes use of a little known feature of the survey: for roughly one out of a hundred of dwelling units sampled, up to ten of their nearest neighboring units are also sampled. The concept of the neighborhood used here is a literal one based on physical proximity of dwellings. 4 The notion of the residential neighborhood is central to a variety of social interactions.
A plethora of phenomena, such as individuals' attitudes towards race, income inequality, crime and ethnicity factors are both causes and effects of the composition of their immediate physical and human environment. 5
I examine empirically the extent in which individuals' valuations of their properties depend upon those of their neighbors. It should be no surprise that the evolution of property values over time exhibits dynamic dependence. However, when neighborhood-average property values are included as regressors as well, the latter emerge as a more important determinant than own lagged values.
This result suggests, as we shall see, that endogenous social effects are present. It could mean that exogenous changes which affect neighborhood-average magnitudes, as do some policy-based interventions, are likely to have numerically large effects.
Most research to date on income and race segregation has used geographic detail which is no smaller than census tracts. A fair amount of research uses data for Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs, for short), which is a much larger geographical unit. Both census tracts and MSAs are arguably too large for studying neighborhood interactions. Data on individual dwelling units, their occupants and their immediate neighbors allow us a glimpse at the workings of many processes which are likely to be averaged out at higher levels of aggregation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the literature on urban neighborhood interactions. Section 3 presents the model of individual behavior in the presence of interdependence within neighborhoods. Section 4 discusses the data and Section 5 develops econometric models for estimating the behavioral model in the presence of neighborhood interactions.
Finally, section 6 presents our empirical results and section 7 concludes.
4 Recent research has provided theoretical foundations for an understanding of the emergence of a variety of economic institutions from local interactions [ Durlauf (1997) ] .
5 See Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman (1996) for social-interactions based explanations of the incidence of crime. See also Gladwell (1996) for an epidemic theory crime explanation of the decrease in crime.
The Literature on Urban Neighborhood Interactions
It is often forgotten that the notion of a neighborhood involves not only spatial proximity but also "a district [ ... ] esp. considered in reference to the character or circumstances of its inhabitants; a small but relatively self-contained sector of a larger urban area" [The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (1993 ), p. 1901 . Surprisingly, neighborhood interactions have attracted relatively little attention. A pioneering piece by Pollak (1976) emphasized the empirical implications of the assumption that preferences of individual members of a group are interdependent, though not necessarily in a neighborhood context, the more recent literature has invoked Nash equilibrium of strategic interactions. Strange (1992) , for example, examines the role of distance and negative feedback in neighborhood effects using an interactive neighborhoods model where spillovers occur because individuals are affected by the densities of neighboring areas. Binder and Pesaran (1997) have adapted a linear-quadratic version of Pollak's model for the presence of social interactions and shown that under certain conditions the model's predictions imply equivalence with the case of self-centered individuals.
In the urban economics literature, the contribution of neighborhood interactions to the evolution of residential patterns and neighborhood characteristics has received much less attention than the role of local public goods. Of course, a neighborhood may evolve around a local public good. Ellickson (1979) provides an explicit model of neighborhood formation, in which individuals care about nonhousing consumption and neighborhood quality, measured as the average housing consumption in each neighborhood. Ellickson assumes initial economies of scale, which are exhausted after some minimum neighborhood size. Ellickson contrasts cooperative behavior, where neighborhood quality is treated as a (local) public good and the outcome is the optimal configuration, with noncooperative behavior, which leads to a suboptimal configuration. Werczberger and Berechman (1988) incorporate neighborhood effects into a multinomial model of spatial location decisions of individuals and firms and give some numerical simulation results. Certain aspects of urban interactions have been discussed by Miyao, who has addressed household location choice [Miyao (1977)] and also investigated the stability properties of mixed-city equilibrium in the context of city-wide interactions [Miyao (1978) ].
There has been some empirical research on the economic consequences of residence-based so-cial interactions on individuals as they pass through various neighborhoods. In particular, Kremer (1997) finds significant linear effects from neighbors' education on individuals' education, and Ioannides (1997) significant nonlinear ones, as well. 6 With the notable exception of Coulson and Bond (1990) , empirical research on the impact of neighborhood effects on residential succession is very limited. 7 These authors test a model, due to Bond and Coulson (1989) , of the inverse demand for dwelling unit and neighborhood characteristics, by using data on FHA loans and contextual data from census tracts. They show that high-income groups are willing to pay more to live in high-income neighborhoods, but find little evidence of an effect of income on the demand for racial composition. I am aware of two other works that examine neighborhood interactions empirically, both of which use local data. Galster (1987) reports empirical results using data from special surveys conducted in Wooster, Ohio, and Minneapolis, Minnesota. He shows that social interactions are very important in explaining home upkeep behavior. 8 Spivack (1991) uses data on code violations from Providence, Rhode Island, and finds some impact of neighborhood variables: ownership patterns and vacancies are the most influential determinants of maintenance and upkeep. Manski (1993) has shown how difficult it is to distinguish, by relying entirely on data, among alternative models of interaction, i.e. situations where individuals' actions appear to be in response to their neighbors' actions rather than their neighbors' characteristics. Therefore, even if suitable data were available, careful statistical analysis may have to go beyond just appending statistical descriptions of a person's neighborhood to her own personal economic and social characteristics and then just running regressions.
A number of studies of urban neighborhood interactions originated in the context of evaluating the urban renewal projects of the 1960's. Davis and Whinston (1961) , Rothenberg (1967) and Schall (1976) study housing maintenance behavior. Stahl (1974) is an exhaustive study of the consequences of neighborhood effects for replacement/rehabilitation of housing and housing maintenance. 10 Spatial proximity is important in understanding neighborhood dynamics associ-6 For a review of key contributions to the literature on neighborhood effects in the area of labor economics, see Ioannides and Loury (1999) .
7 Anas (1978) models the behavior of suppliers in the presence of exogenous neighborhood effects. 8 Homeowners in "most-cohesive neighborhoods" spend 28-45% more on upkeep. There is also evidence of socialthreshold effects, in that social interactions are important only if "collective solidarity sentiments result." More importantly, Galster indicates that he has found evidence in favor of powerful self-fulfilling expectations 9 , and that evidence would exonerate the behavior of the "in-migrating" households as the key cause of neighborhood deterioration.
10 Henderson (1985), p. 82, 98-100, assumes static preferences for consumers and dynamic behavior for landlords.
ated with such phenomena as neighborhood tipping, where except for the path-breaking work by Schelling (1971) there little analytical work that can be used to structure empirical investigation.
Clark (1991) and Lee and Wood (1991) have tested variants of the Schelling model. Finally, there appears to be no research in the hedonic analysis if housing markets literature on interactive property valuations, perhaps because of the lack of data. A recent exhaustive survey by Sheppard (1999) mentions spatial interactions only in the context of the possible importance of spatial autocorrelation [ ibid., p. 1618 ], but cites no research on social interactions as such. Arguably, the only somewhat related paper is Kiel and Zabel (1997) , except that their emphasis is on comparing the relative performance of cluster-level vs. census-tract level variables. We discuss their work further below.
The Model
The notation which I use in presenting the model and in describing the data is as follows. Let κ = 1, . . . , K t , denote each of the neighborhoods, which are identified by their kernels, the members of the original national sample whose neighbors were also interviewed. A time subscript t for each of the waves is used when appropriate. Let n(i) denote the set of the neighbors of unit i, a definition which also applies to the kernel unit κ; J i denote unit i's entire neighborhood including itself:
I shall use |n(κ)| to denote the size of kernel κ's neighborhood, which because of missing values may be different from 11. This, somewhat cumbersome, notation is necessary for expressing the full flavor of our setting.
An individual h cares about the quality of housing services produced by her property i, Y hit , which is assumed to also be equal to the number of units of quality it contains, "its size;" its value is denoted by V iht = p it Y iht . The quality of a property undergoes random deterioration, which is described by a random variable ψ, whose probability distribution function is denoted by F (ψ), and whose particular realization for unit i at time t is denoted by Ψ it . The effects of the deterioration may be dealt with by means of maintenance, whose magnitude is denoted by m iht and measured in the same units as quality. The cost of maintenance is denoted by p it m iht .
Henderson simplifies the Stahl model and examines theoretically the optimality properties of symmetric neighborhood equilibria for the rental housing market, where individuals care about average housing quality in their neighborhoods.
If not maintained by its owner , housing unit i at time t has quality Y hit−1 . If it is maintained by spending m iht , on the other hand, its quality becomes:
where H(·) is assumed to be concave with respect to all its arguments. I assume that maintenance pays for all values of the deterioration shock:
Let u ht (Y hit , c ht ; Y {n(i)t} ) denote individual h's period t utility function, as a function of consumption of housing services, , Y hit , nonhousing consumption, c ht , and the vector of qualities of all neighboring properties, Y {n(i)t} . We assume that utility u ht (·) is increasing and concave with respect to housing services and nonhousing consumption. I will return to discuss further its properties with respect to Y {n(i)t} .
Let individual h's total nonhousing wealth as of the beginning of period t be denoted by Ω ht , which includes human and nonhuman wealth but not period t earnings, I ht , and let her financial wealth as of the end of period t be denoted by A ht . Maximum utility from consumption in period t+1 and on is assumed to be increasing and concave with respect to total wealth as of the beginning of period t + 1, U ht+1 (Ω ht+1 ). It reflects the value to the individual from all options she might avail herself of in the future and is defined after the realization of period t + 1 deterioration shock.
I consider first the problem of an individual who buys a new property i of size Y n iht at time t.
The individual's period t budget constraint is:
Total wealth as of the beginning of the period t + 1 satisfies the following equation:
where I ht+1 denotes earnings in period t + 1 on, r t+1 denotes an one-period deterministic rate of return on non-housing assets, and m hit+1 denotes maintenance costs. One readily recognizes that optimal maintenance m n hit+1 reduces to the decomposable problem of maximizing value net of maintenance costs, and thus satisfies:
I specify the model so that it always pays to maintain, whether or not an owner wishes to hold on to a unit or to sell. I note that the optimal solution does not depend on the characteristics of the owner and write it as: m n hit+1 = M (Y n hit , Ψ it+1 ). Combining (2) and (3) yields:
Borrowing constraints and other financial issues can, of course, be expressed by modifying the above equations.
Total lifetime utility for individual h who enters the neighborhood at time t is:
where the expectation is taken with respect to all unknown variables as of time t. Time preference is accounted for through υ. I refrain at present from making any additional specific assumptions about the dependence of u upon Y {n(i)t} . In general, the quality of an individual's property is positively affected by those of her neighbors, with dependence on the mean quality in her neighborhood being just one of the various possibilities.
The optimal value of quality of a newly purchased residence Y n hit and the associated first period consumption satisfy the following first-order conditions:
Using (8) in (7) allows us to transform it into the standard property of durable goods. That is, under the assumption that p it+1 is deterministic and the period t deterioration shock is known, then (7) and (8) imply:
By iterating the above equation forward with respect to p it+1 , we obtain the classic valuation condition for housing as a durable good: the price of a unit of housing is equal to the value of the stream of services to be derived from a marginal unit of the housing stock. [c.f. Poterba (1984) ].
A variation of the same equation constitutes the basis of hedonic regressions of housing values.
The optimal value of Y n hit , may be written as:
The dependence of Y n hit on Y {n(i)t} is due to the presence of Y {n(i)t} in the first-period component of the utility function. The expectation in the RHS of (8) I now turn to the problem of an individual h who already owns a house i of value Y o hit−1 in the beginning of period t, has neighbors n(i), observes Ψ it , and chooses nonhousing consumption c ht and the amount of maintenance m o it . Total wealth as of the beginning of period t is defined
and the period t + 1 constraint is similar to (5) with the obvious changes:
Utility maximization requires that m o it is chosen so as to maximize
The first-order condition for the optimal value of maintenance is the same as (4), applied at time t. The optimal value for maintenance may be written as
, and the optimal value of Y o hit , becomes:
Finally, maximization of lifetime utility,
taking as given the state of all neighborhood properties Y {n(i)t} , determines optimal consumption.
The first-order conditions for the optimal values of consumption is given by a condition which is similar to (8) above, save for the obvious changes. So, again, unless the utility function is separable with respect to the impact of Y {n(i)t} , neighborhood condition would affect optimum utility.
Neighborhood Equilibrium
In a Nash setting, individual h takes as given her neighbors' decisions and ignores the impact of her own decisions upon Y {n(i)t} . I note that the dependence of Y n hit on Y {n(i)t} , a dependence that I refer to as neighborhood effects, would follow, in general, from the specification of the utility function. However, even if the utility function were assumed to be decomposable with respect to the consumption bundle, on one hand, and neighborhood effects, on the other, dependence on neighborhood effects would still arise because of "spatial" (neighborhood) arbitrage, as individuals are allocated to different neighborhoods. New residents enter, some of the old residents leave while others remain.
Let J n i and J o i denote the subsets of J i consisting of units, respectively, occupied by new entrants, and by continuing residents of a particular neighborhood. The solutions for housing demand, (10) and (13), when considered as a system, implies a mapping: if unit i is occupied by a new resident h, i ∈ J n i , then a new entrant's housing stock depends on her own characteristics, and on the vector of housing stocks in the neighborhood
else, if unit i is occupied by a continuing resident h, i ∈ J o i , then:
where p n(i)t denotes the housing price in the neighborhood cluster of unit i at time t. Therefore, the dynamic evolution of the vector of housing qualities in a neighborhood possesses a switching law structure, whose general description is obtained by treating the conditions for new entrants and for continuing residents, respectively, as a simultaneous system:
where
When construed for ∀i ∈ J i and under the assumption that all individuals observe the vector of neighborhood housing qualities, the mapping (15) defines a Nash equilibrium for the vector of housing qualities in neighborhood J i . That is, in a Nash equilibrium, the quality of each housing property is a function of the vector of shocks affecting all neighborhood properties and of the vector of individual wealths, and is conditional on dwelling unit qualities in the previous period. This equation may be rewritten in terms of property values, which are observable, rather than qualities, which are unobservable. Therefore, by equilibrium in each neighborhood, the presence of continuing residents causes prices and thus property values in the neighborhood to reflect maintenance shocks and lagged property values. Furthermore, the inflow of new residents causes prices and thus property values to reflect neighborhood effects through newcomers' valuations.
Equ. (15) describes schematically the joint determination of neighborhood housing quality through neighborhood interactions. Several important conclusions follow from neighborhood Nash equilibrium. First, (3) and (15) imply a spatial dependence in the intertemporal evolution of individuals' wealth. Second, individuals' and their offspring's nonhousing wealth are interdependent through common schooling as well as other shared factors that may develop through physical proximity and are relevant to productivity. Third, the particular decision problem underlying (14) may serve as a prototype for a variety of decisions in social settings.
I turn next to a qualitative description of the model. Equilibrium in each neighborhood reflects the fact that new residents' have chosen a neighborhood because it offered higher utility than all of their alternative courses of action. Similarly, old residents have chosen to remain in a neighborhood because it offered higher utility than all of their alternative courses of action. Neighborhood composition based on choice is critical in understanding self-selection. The occupants of each neighborhood cluster are not a random sample of the population. Or put differently, individuals' incomes in each neighborhood (and other characteristics) may be neither identical nor distributed according to the national income distribution.
In this paper, I take the composition of different neighborhoods as given. However, a straightforward implication of the model in Holger and Sieg (1999) is that even if individual utility is separable in the influence of the neighborhood housing stock for both new and continuing residents, in which case housing demand by new residents is independent of the neighborhood housing stock, selection introduces such dependence. This follows from the fact that associating neighborhood choice with utility comparisons implies bounds which themselves depend on neighborhood housing stocks. I also take housing prices as given. 11
Data
The AHS is a panel of housing units, which was redesigned in 1985 and involves more than 50,000 dwelling units that are interviewed each two years. This paper explores an additional, and neglected (in spite of its rarity) dimension of the data, data on neighborhood clusters, which are available for years 1985, 1989, and 1993 . In those years only, a random sample of originally 680 ( and subsequently more ) urban units were selected and for each one of them (up to) ten neighbor units were interviewed. Each such cluster includes the randomly chosen member of the national file (which is an urban AHS unit), the so-called kernel, and the ten homes closest to it [Hadden and Leger (1990) , p. 1-51]. The cluster may contain fewer than 10 units if some could not be interviewed. Appendix A provides details on sample structure and data availability.
The empirical investigation reported here is based on data from the 1985 and 1989 waves of the American Housing Survey (AHS) data. 12 Only a small number of papers, that is, de Bartolome and Rosenthal (1996) , Rosenthal (1996a, 1996b) , Hoyt and Rosenthal (1997) , Ioannides and Hardman (1998) , Ioannides and Zabel (2000a,b) and Kiel and Zabel (1997) I note, however, that because of its design, the randomly selected sample of kernels their imme-diate neighbors delivers a snapshot of clusters of urban dwellings in the United States. The data tell us nothing about proximity to urban/metro centers and to physical barriers; and the frequency of sampling over time is less than ideal. It does allow us to study the outcomes of several economic processes which evolve around spatial interactions. As such, it is a valuable setting for testing empirically fundamental aspects of local interaction, as it enables us to capture the essential feature of combined spatial and dynamic interdependence.
The total number of cross-sectional observations for 1985, 1989, and 1993, respectively, A basic set of descriptive statistics are given in Tables 1 and 2. Table 1 compares data from the Statistical Abstract of the United States and from my own processing of the AHS data for the purpose of establishing the representativeness of the AHS data. Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for the AHS data for all three waves of available data. Details on the construction of variables are given in Appendix B.
Referring to Table 2 , the mix of socioeconomic characteristics of the members of neighborhoods 14 I am grateful to Barbara T. Williams, US Bureau of the Census, for this clarification.
is of particular interest to us. In 1985 .2%, and 81.3% of the kernels have household heads who are White. When one looks at housing tenure, 55.5%, 55.2% and 51.5% of all kernels are owner-occupied, while the corresponding numbers for the entire sample are 54.0%, 54.0% and 53.1%.
Not surprisingly, the dispersion of the cluster-averaged data is smaller than that of the full sample. Still, this obscures a fair amount of heterogeneity across neighborhoods. While the mean value of household income for the kernels, which make up a random subsample of the main AHS sample of the U.S. population, and that of cluster means are very close to one another, as one would indeed expect, the dispersion is much larger than one would expect from statistical sampling theory. Roughly speaking, random samples of size ten should produce a standard deviation of roughly one-third of that of the kernels. The observed standard deviations are at least twice as much as that, which implies that the distribution of income within neighborhoods is much more dispersed than what random sampling would imply. This aspect of the data is in accordance with notions of self selection in neighborhoods and is explored further in Ioannides and Hardman (1998) and Ioannides (2000) .
There is substantial turnover within the four-year span between two successive waves that I am working with. Moves, on one hand, are beneficial in making the sample more representative, in principle, because individuals reassess their information and units get revalued by the market. They do, on the other, cause sample selection problems. Because of the pattern of new entrants (clusters, units and individuals) there is actually little data left with a structure which may be amenable to estimation with panel techniques. After I had performed a number of econometric experiments with the two cross-sections that are available for estimating a dynamic model, I decided to present only one, with data from two successive periods, 1985 and 1989. Still, the period covered by the data offers some distinct advantages. Great real estate appreciation during the 1980's, gave way to depreciations during the late 1980's and the early 1990's, and both episodes exhibited pronounced regional variations.
Estimation of Models of Neighborhood Interaction
Following a (by now standard) typology of social interaction models proposed by Manski (1993) , one may identify two types of social effects. An endogenous social effect is present, if an individual's behavior is affected by the actual, (or expected), behavior of her neighbors. This "keeping up with the Joneses" effect gives rise to a so-called "social multiplier," through which, as Manski (1993) notes, policy intervention works to impact the behavior of an entire social group. Another type of social effect refers to agents' responding to the average (or some other measure of aggregation for the distribution) of various individual attributes of interest within the neighborhood, such as racial and ethnic composition of the neighborhood, neighborhood income distribution and the like. 15 This is the so-called exogenous social, or contextual, effect, whereby one cares about, or reacts to, one's neighbors' attributes, rather than one's neighbors' actions. Endogenous and exogenous social effects are often confused with one another. 16 There may also be a correlated effect among residential neighbors, if all dwelling units in a neighborhood tend to be occupied by individuals of similar socioeconomic characteristics. 17
Let y iκht denote an endogenous variable, associated with a specific housing unit i in cluster κ; Y t denotes the vector made up of all the y iκht 's. I use this framework below with a household's own valuation 18 of dwelling unit i, located in neighborhood κ and occupied by household h at time t as an endogenous variable. I study maintenance behavior in Ioannides (2000b) . According to (10), (13) and (15), y iκht may be specified as a function, in general, of the subvector of Y t that is made up of the endogenous variables associated with h's neighbors, of a household's own socioeconomic characteristics, z ht , and of a number of additional factors, such as variables reflecting socioeconomic characteristics of one's neighbors, conditional on neighborhood characteristics and on 15 Such an effect could reflect a variety of motivations. E.g., the fact that a neighborhood may becoming occupied by higher income people is perceived as a good omen for a neighborhood's future, by higher income people, but a bad one, by lower income people.
16 See for example, Manski's critique of Crane (1991) . Crane poses an epidemic model of endogenous neighborhood effects, where dropout and childbearing behavior by teenagers is influenced by the frequency of such behavior within the neighborhood. However, Crane estimates a contextual-effects model, where a teenager's behavior is influenced by the occupational composition of her neighborhood.
17 This may come about through selection, which as I argued above, may involve more than one characteristic. Consequently, selection may produce imperfect segregation in terms of, say, wealth or income. Similar could be an effect caused by response to an unobserved shock, such a change in the vicinity of the urban area, or by an unobserved individual characteristic.
18 See Kiel and Carson (1990) 
where Π denotes a known weighting matrix of dimensions I × I that defines spatial interaction (and is discussed further below), and Π i is its ith row; α, β and µ denote scalar unknown parameters, and η and γ vectors of unknown parameters. The error term u iκht in the RHS of (16) captures the impact of unobserved factors, conditional on neighborhood and individual dwelling unit characteristics, for which I assume that:
where δ x , δ q , denote vectors of unknown parameters.
Referring again to the Manski typology, the term βΠ i Y t in the RHS of Equ. (16) expresses a contextual effect, an exogenous social effect: given the characteristics x κt of the neighborhood κ where unit i is located and unit i's own characteristics q it , this term gives the effect of the distributions of variables of potential interest, like racial and ethnic composition, within the neighborhood. The conditional mean of u iκht , from (17), δ x x κt + δit , expresses correlated effects:
units in the same neighborhood with characteristics x κt and individual dwelling units with characteristics q it tend to have similar unobserved individual characteristics. The term ηz ht reflects the direct effect of the owner's characteristics upon the valuation of the dwelling they occupy, in part because of taste, income etc., or the decisions about maintenance that they make. In contrast, the term γE[z ht |x κt , q it ] reflects the impact of the expected characteristics of occupants, conditional on cluster characteristics x κt , and unit characteristics q it . Such dependence follows as an outcome 19 Ioannides and Zabel (2000b) pursues that line of inquiry.
of sorting features of the matching process of households with dwelling units, whereby individuals' interest in the socioeconomic profile of their neighborhood is mediated in the residential matching process. Unless matching is perfectly random, this expectation is likely to depend upon (x κt , q it ).
As Manski (1993) 
Spatial Interaction
The spatial weighting matrix Π, employed in Equ. (16) above, is block-diagonal of size I × I, with elements in each row summing up to 1. Its entries are defined as
, ∀i, j ∈ n(i), i = j, and π ii = 0, otherwise.
The endogenous effect is generated within the neighborhood sample consisting of the kernel and its neighborhood cluster, rather than within the entire population from which the sample was drawn.
21 20 However, one should not exclude the possibility that individual members of a cluster in our sample also interact with other individuals outside the cluster. Such influences must be treated as omitted variables.
21 As an example consider three kernels, κ = 1, 2, 3, with associated cluster sizes n1 = 3, n2 = 4, n3 = 3. Variable neighborhood cluster sizes are due to missing values. The weighting matrix has size: I = n1 + n2 + n3 = 10. In writing the respective matrix I assume that the vector Y is formed by stacking neighborhood by neighborhood, and within each neighborhood first the variables associated with kernels and then those of each kernel's neighbors. Specifically: 
Spatial Stochastic Structure
I refer to (16) and define the unobserved component of the correlated effect, iκht , as the deviation of u iκht from its mean, conditional on neighborhood and dwelling unit characteristics,
Let t and u t denote the vectors of size I obtained by stacking up in the obvious way errors iκht , defined above, and u iκht , defined in (16). Unfortunately, I may not define a richer stochastic structure, where we would distinguish a time-invariant unit-specific effect associated with unit i in neighborhood κ, and a time-invariant individual-specific effect associated with individual h, as individuals are not separately identified from units. Specific units are inseparably associated with their neighborhoods, and thus likely to share a individual effect that is common to all units belonging to the same neighborhood.
I assume that t , the unobserved component of the correlated effect defined above, consists of a neighborhood interactions term and a random error,
where ε t is a I × 1 vector of purely random errors, with E(ε t ) = ι I 0, ι I is the unit column vector of size I, and Var(ε t ) = σ 2 ε I, where I is the unit diagonal matrix of dimension I. The term τ Π t has the interpretation that the error terms for all observations contain τ times the average error realized by all of each unit's neighbors. Spatial correlation in errors, represented here by the spatial autocorrelation coefficient τ , may be present when unobserved spatially correlated variables, possibly due to self-selection, affect the endogenous variable of interest. Consistency of social interaction requires t = [I − τ Π] −1 ε t , provided that the matrix [I − τ Π] is invertible.
Equ. (16) may be rewritten in vector form as:
where the vector Y t stacks the individual observations, and the matrices X t , Q t , Z t are defined in terms of the respective vectors of characteristics x κt , q it , z ht in the obvious way. Equ. (19) represents the endogenous variables as a system of simultaneous equations. It expresses the condition for Nash equilibrium in neighborhood interactions as a structural form.
Under the Nash assumption that individuals take their neighbors' actions as given and that [I − βΠ] is invertible, I solve (19) as a simultaneous system for Y t to obtain:
After tedious but elementary transformations, 22 Equ. (20) may be transformed further to yield a reduced-form as follows:
, and vectors and matrices in the RHS of (21) with bars indicate, for each observation i, the average, within i's neighborhood n(i), values of the entries in the ith row of each of the corresponding matrices. This may be simplified, again by elementary transformations, to yield: 23ε
whereε ν t denotes the vector of size I obtained by replacing each component i of ε t by the average value of ε t among unit i's neighbors including itself. Inspection of the RHS of Equ. (22) suggests that its variance-covariance matrix may be written in terms of σ 2 ε , β, τ, and n, which is exogenous and fixed at 10. 24 Considering the complexity of the above derivation, we will test below the spatial interaction in the error structure by means of cluster-specific random effects.
22 I note that [I − βΠ] is block-diagonal, with blocks corresponding to neighborhoods ; for any neighborhood of size n, the respective block may be written as:
In − β n−1 ιnι n = θ1In − θ2ιnι n , where ιn denotes the unit column vector of size n, In denotes the unit diagonal matrix of size n × n, and θ1, θ2 are defined as: θ1 ≡ 1 + and write [In − τ Πn] = ξ1In − ξ2ιnι n . The inverses of those matrices may be written as follows [ Case (1992) ]: 24 Manski's result still applies, of course, in that separate identification of γ from β requires knowledge of E [Zt|Xt, Qt] . This follows from (19) by solving for the expectation of the average Yt in each neighborhood con-
Identification and Estimation
Pausing first to summarize, I have expressed Nash equilibrium within each neighborhood by means of a system of equations in structural form, (19), and in reduced form, (21). Both those systems may be estimated with the AHS neighborhood clusters data, where care must be taken to allow for spatial stochastic dependence. Both those equations allow one to identify the effect of social interactions.
Inspection of the RHS of Equ. (21) , which agrees with Manski, again. As we argued above, E[Zt|Xt, Qt] depends upon properties of the matching mechanism in the housing market and is likely to depend upon (Xt, Qt), possibly in a complicated non-linear manner, which itself may buy identification, as Brock and Durlauf (1999) emphasize. Ioannides and Zabel (2000b) pursue this line of research.
25 Although not specifically derived, this result was clearly anticipated by Manski: "If one observes the process out of equilibrium, the recursive structure of [ the dynamic version of the linear model ] opens new possibilities for identification" [ Manski, op. cit., p. 540 ] .
spatial autocorrelation has the effect of magnifying the effect of the individual i.i.d. stochastic shocks ε t . If τ, the spatial autocorrelation coefficient, is small,ε t is a multiple of ε t , with a factor of proportionality close to, but greater than, 1. The factor of proportionality is increasing in τ but the variance-covariance matrix is diagonal. Unfortunately, there is no way to identify τ in the absence of social interaction.
If social interactions are present, that is if β = 0, (22) implies that the variance-covariance matrix of the error structure in (21) is non-diagonal and it contains both β and τ. If spatial autocorrelation is absent, then the variance-covariance matrix is diagonal. GLS may be adapted in order to estimate τ from the variance-covariance matrix of neighboring units. If, on the other hand, β is close to 1, then the social interaction terms become dominant. Whereas the estimation of τ rests entirely on the error structure 26 , estimation of β involves both the error structure and the coefficients of several RHS variables. 27 (19) and (21). It is appropriate to summarize how those equations differ. Equation (19) is a structural form, where the dependent variable y iκht is a function of its own lagged value, y iκht−1 , of the mean of the dependent variable among i's neighboring units (that is, the ith row of βΠY t ), of individual h's own characteristics, ηz ht , of the characteristics of unit i's neighborhood cluster, δ x x it , of unit i s own characteristics, δit , and of the socioeconomic characteristics of the neighborhood cluster, conditional on cluster and unit characteristics, γE[Z t |X t , Q t ]. Identification of the latter effect requires considering neighborhood choice and may not be handled by the techniques and data of this paper. That may only be accomplished by means of a richer data set that allows us to study matching of individuals with neighborhoods and dwelling units [ Ioannides and Zabel (2000b) ].
Empirical Results

I performed a number of econometric experiments along the lines of Equations
Therefore, I set γ = 0, and the social interactions effect β may be identified as the coefficient of the predicted mean of the dependent variable among a unit's neighboring units. This requires 2SLS estimation in the presence of correlated disturbances, the latter being induced the spatial stochastic structure, and is subject to the usual identification restrictions. Equ. (21), on the other hand, is a reduced form, where the dependent variable y iκht is a function of a similar set of regressors as in the case of the reduced form, except that identification of the social interactions effect now rests in part on the own lagged value coefficient. In the remainder of this section I report first results along the lines of Equ. (19), and then I turn to results obtained with Equ. (21).
An important feature of the present approach as a way to identify social interactions is that this model may benefit from a straightforward application of hedonic theory of housing markets [ Rosen The presentation of the results in Table 3 is organized according to groups of cluster-specific variables, the X s, of dwelling-unit variables, the Q s, and of individual-specific variables, the Z s. All of these groups are significant. In the first group of regressions, reported respectively in Columns 1 and 2, I treat observations belonging to the same cluster as independent. However, as the preceding section makes clear, spatial interactions may induce a stochastic structure within each cluster which may be naturally modelled by means of cluster-specific random effects. I also estimate cluster-specific fixed effects, and test those two stochastic structures, as well. Columns 3 28 One could justify the presence of individual occupant characteristics in hedonic regressions as proxies for census tract characteristics as contextual effects. Unlike Kiel and Zabel (1998) , I do not have access to information on census tracts to which clusters belong. Therefore, I cannot link the Xt variables to census tract level data. However, it is noteworthy that Kiel and Zabel find means and standard deviations of the cluster and census tract level neighborhood variables to be fairly similar and the correlation between the two sets of variables is .82. As they put it, "overall, there does not seem to be a great deal of difference between the cluster and the tract measures. ... When comparisons are made in a regression context, we find evidence that the cluster variables have greater explanatory power than do tract level variables." [ ibid., p. 23 ]. Also, Ioannides and Zabel (2000a) use occupant data from a larger sample of the AHS, the entire metropolitan sample, as proxies for neighborhood effects.
and 4 present results with cluster-specific effects: Column 3 allows for fixed cluster-specific effects, and Column 4 allows for random cluster-specific effects. All t statistics reported are robust with respect to heteroscedasticity associated with the neighborhood clusters.
The regressions in columns 2, 3 and 4 include as an explanatory variable the average predicted value of the dependent variable among a unit's neighbors. These predicted values are used to instrument βΠY t in the RHS of (19). They have been computed using the estimated coefficients from hedonic regression reported in Column 1, where a household's own characteristics have been I note, in particular, that when both the lagged dependent variable and the predicted mean value among each individual's neighbors in the cluster are included they are highly significant and improve the overall fit. In fact, the estimate of the effect of the latter is larger than that of the former, implying a more important role for the social interaction effect. Specifically, for the property valuation model the coefficients of the social interaction term are .651 and .716, respectively, for the fixed effects and the random effects model, with both being highly statistically significant. Similarly, for the property valuation model the coefficients of the own lagged term are .301 and .157, respectively, for the fixed effects and the random effects model, with both being highly statistically significant. I interpret these results as evidence of significant social interaction in neighborhoods, where individuals are affected by the valuation behavior of their neighbors.
I note that while the t statistics I report are obtained from OLS, I have also tried to correct for the fact that the social interactions term is a predicted value. In principle, this could be done with 2SLS or simultaneous equations methods. Unfortunately, the model is very difficult to estimate by means of 2SLS with standard econometric packages. I have also tried to estimate the model as a simultaneous system, with the hedonic equations for all neighbors estimated at a first-stage regression and the valuation as a second-stage regression. Unfortunately, a very large number of parameters is involved while the degrees of freedom are substantially reduced because each cluster must be treated as an observation unit. While the full correction in the presence of individual effects is quite complicated, it turns out not to matter in this case, and the t statistics I report are actually accurate. 30
Introducing fixed effects is highly significant, as a comparison Table 3 , Columns 2 and 3 indicate.
Their inclusion in both models increases enormously the adjusted R 2 of the regression, from .577 to .9979, for the property valuation model. While a substantial improvement in the quality of fit is, of course, to be expected, the fact that the social interactions variable remains significant is highly supportive of the notion of neighborhood effects. 31
The discussion of Equ.'s (21) and (22) above suggests that a cluster-specific random effects model could be a simple way to deal with spatial elements of stochastic structure. As is well known, fixed-vs. random effect specifications may be tested by means of the Hausman specification test.
The Hausman test allows one to test the null hypothesis that the random effects are uncorrelated with the regressors, which is required by GLS theory. Under that null hypothesis, both the fixed effects and the random effects estimators are consistent, but the fixed effects model is inefficient.
The test rests on the difference between the two estimators. The Hausman test does reject, in our case, the null hypothesis very strongly. I think that an appropriate interpretation of this rejection is that omitted variables in the specification of the model with random effects is the culprit, as the random effects model fits reasonably well. I should note that for the property valuation model, the within and between R 2 's are .103 and .645, respectively, with the fraction of the overall variance that is due to the random effect is 0.410. I interpret the significance of the random effects model on its own as lending some support to the spatial stochastic structure that was introduced in the preceding section. I should note that the Hausman specification test may not used if cluster-specific 30 See Ioannides and Zabel (2000a) for an explanation of the necessary correction. 31 Fixed effects do make sense as a device to model unobserved components of social effects and have been used by previous authors, too. See Munshi and Myaux (1998) for a related application of fixed effects as social effects.
socioeconomic characteristics are included as a source of contextual effects, because they may not coexist with cluster-specific fixed effects.
If housing markets do price properties correctly, we would expect that social interactions would make their presence felt even if we were to exclude the lagged value of the dependent variable. Pure curiosity suggests that this is worth a try, and the results of the regression, like the one reported on Column 3, again with fixed effects, is reported in Column 5, Table 3 . The social interactions coefficient now jumps to .874, with a t−statistic of 18.26 and an R 2 of .9974. The other regressors do not perform very differently.
A noteworthy result is that the estimated coefficient for income for the property valuation model are .048 and .028, from Columns 3 and 4, and both statistically significant. These coefficients are a bit puzzling, because they may be interpreted as income elasticities of housing consumption for owners. In an effort to examine whether the numerically weak performance of income is due to the inclusion of the own lagged value in the property valuation regressions, I also estimated those models by excluding the own lagged values, and the results were quite similar. 32
Next I turn to estimations along the lines of Equ. (21), which is the reduced-form counterpart of Equ. (19). Recall the discussion following Equation (21), which shows that estimates of the social interactions coefficient may be obtained from the estimates of the coefficients of the own lagged value and of the predicted mean of that variable among one's neighbors. I have also carried out such regressions. I report in Table 4 only a subset of the estimates, for reasons of brevity.
For the purpose of comparison, I reproduce at the top portion of Table 4 the key results from the structural form estimates reported in Table 3 . The fits obtained with the reduced-form regressions are not as good as those with the structural-form ones. Again, the random-effects model gives a better fit. From the ratio of the coefficients ofȲ 85 and Y 85 , which is equal to n n−1 β 1−β , the point estimates ofβ for the property valuation model are 0.179 and 0.209. These estimates 33 are obtained by using the average number of observations per cluster, n = 6.9. (This number differs from 10 considerably, primarily because of missing values and of the fact that observations for renters may not be used in these regressions). They are quite different from those for the social interactions 32 The estimates of the income elasticity of housing valuations obtained here are very similar to those of Ioannides and Zabel (2000a) , who aim at estimating a housing demand model with neighborhood effects.
33 I have also tried, but failed, to estimate β by means of nonlinear least squares.
coefficient obtained with the structural form. While these results are clearly disappointing, they
should not overshadow the important findings obtained with the structural-form model.
Conclusions
I explore a relatively neglected feature of data from the American Housing Survey for 1985, 1989 and 1993, namely the availability of data on neighborhood clusters in urban areas of the United
States. This feature of the data allows me to estimate a model of social interactions at the neighborhood level. The concept of a neighborhood invoked here is quite literally that of a residential neighborhood that consists of a dwelling unit and its ten nearest neighbors. Therefore, these are novel results in the neighborhood effects literature. Most previous work is based on using contextual information associated with the census tract where a unit of observation belongs.
The model allows me to identify the effect of social interactions. Using a structural form equation, the impact of social interactions is found to be quite substantial for the property valuation model. The respective coefficient ranges from .651 to .716, when the lagged property valuation is also included, and to .874, when the lagged property valuation is excluded. The social interaction effects is found to be both stronger and more significant then that of the own lagged value, when both are included. The results provide empirical support for the notion of residential neighborhood effects. That is, individuals' valuations of their properties are influenced by those of their neighbors.
As a positive finding, this may be interpreted as supportive of the notion, common in the real estate world, that the neighborhood is very important as a determinant of property valuations. It is also supportive of the notion that public policy interventions may bring about urban neighborhood change through a social multiplier.
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